

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 25, 2002

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Matt Forsbacka and Paul Gubanc, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending January 25, 2002

This is Mr. Gubanc's last weekly report as an Oak Ridge Site Representative. Effective January 28, 2002, Mr. Gubanc will commence a four-month detail to DOE's Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management to conduct a special study on 10CFR830 implementation.

A. Y-12 Disassembly: Disassembly of the first unit continued this week with the continued accumulation of lessons learned.(2-A)

B. Y-12 Building 9206:

1. The NNSA Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for pyrophoric stabilization is now anticipated to start on February 25.
2. Last week, BWXT opened and inspected a long-inactive HEPA filter bank in Bldg 9206 which contains an excess accumulation of fissile material. The enclosure was dry and the filters were intact. On an expedited basis, BWXT will install drain holes in the HEPA enclosure. BWXT is also reevaluating the deactivation-plan priority assigned to removing these filters entirely. (3-A)

C. ORNL Building 3019:

1. On Wednesday, an attempt to replace a U-233 container back in a storage well in 3019A met with unexpected difficulty. ORNL believes the canister was incompletely grappled and hung at a cocked angle making it hang up where the well diameter tapers from 6" to 4". The container was replaced in the storage drum it came from; it was not dropped. ORNL is attempting to recreate the postulated problem with a test container to determine a solution.
2. This week, Bechtel Jacobs' (BJC) subcontractor completed non-destructive assay of the 3019B ventilation ducts which contain perchlorates and fissile material. Preliminary analysis, pending additional confirmatory measurement and independent review, suggest the U-235 holdup is less than 500 grams. (3-A, 3-B)

D. Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF): BWXT has taken the position that excavation of incompetent soil and replacing it with structural fill material is the preferred approach for the conceptual design of the HEUMF. BWXT has furnished the modified Design Criteria to the anticipated Architect-Engineer firm. In addition, consultants from BWXT's parent company have recommended further geotechnical characterization of the subsurface conditions. (1-C)

E. Y-12 Enriched Uranium Reduction Vessel: BWXT has proposed to not further characterize the reduction vessel prior to restarting reduction operations and has asked for NNSA's response to the positive Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQD). The proposed solution to the USQD is to lower the peak furnace temperature. Reduction operations remain suspended. (2-A)

cc: Board Members